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Abstract: Crude oil is the stimulating engine of world industry and has directly or indirectly dedicated a big deal of 
international trades to itself. The Group of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) is in charge of the control of the 
main portion of the production and export of this product. On the other hand through its regulations and multi-aspect 
rules, the WTO supervises the trade of this product as well as the services between the OPEC members. However, 
the role of this organization in world trade of crude oil and its relations with OPEC is unclear. Today, both OPEC 
and WTO are eminent international financial organizations. WTO and OPEC each play a completely distinct role in 
the global financial stage. The former plays this role through its harsh and rigid regulations and the latter by its 
constant change in the oil price. Things which develop the complex issues of international laws and their related 
policies are the major position of OPEC in making negotiations regarding the production and procurement of crude 
oil and finally appraising it on one hand and the position of WTO in making rules of international trades regarding 
all trading goods on the other. This will raise questions such as: What is the effect of WTO on oil?, Can OPEC and 
WTO coexist?, is it possible that a country be satisfied of its simultaneous membership of both organizations?
[Rasoul Abafat, Ali Abbasi Abkhareh and Nader FuladPanjeh. World Trade Organization (WTO) and its 
challenges with OPEC. Journal of American Science 2011;7(7):842-847]. (ISSN: 1545-1003). 
http://www.americanscience.org. 
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1. Introduction
For years it was assumed that oil is 
excluded from the area of GATT’s business 
negotiations and agreements. 
While many of the goods became 
subject to the laws of international trade in the 
primary agreement, oil and oil products were never 
clearly discussed in business negotiations.
Most of the Asian or African countries 
exporting oil were practically colonies of GATT 
through the first years of their emergence (till early 
1960s). The total production chain of oil in these 
countries was under the control of international oil 
companies. Since Europe did not produce much oil, 
European countries did not set high custom tariffs on 
oil and oil products. In such circumstances where oil 
producing countries could not influence the 
international oil trade, they did not have an active 
participation in GATT. This was a reason for not 
discussing oil in the cycle of business negotiations.
Yet, some other oil exporting countries 
like Mexico became a member of GATT many years 
ago and have been active in negotiations ever since. 
In the process of negotiations for joining, Mexico 
was able to include a special condition in his joining 
protocol regarding oil under the title “conserving 
natural resources”. This condition exempted Mexico 
from some of GATT’s necessities in oil and oil 
policy part. Besides, Mexico had a key role in 
negotiations in Uruguay for policies about appraising 
natural resources and could affect the results by 
making changes in the final drafts of the proceedings 
of the negotiations (Ja’fari, 2005).
It should of course be noted that neither 
in GATT’s rules nor in WTO’s existed any 
instructions to except oil and oil products from the 
approved rules and even in article 20 of GATT’s 
rules there has been an indirect notice to oil. In the 
same article, which is related to “general exceptions”, 
it has been mentioned that countries are free to make 
rules for their export of natural resources in order to 
save them. The mentioned rule will give the 
petroleum-exporting countries the right to decide 
about their natural resources by restricting their 
exports with having in mind the basis of governing 
the natural resources.
We will briefly go through the effect of 
WTO’s agreements on oil in the following parts.
2. General Agreement on Tariff & Trade 1994
(GATT 94)
This agreement consists of some rules and 
regulations regarding the activities of governments 
and nongovernmental companies in field of import 
and export which leads into free trade of goods and 
services and is based on three principles which are 
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Most Favored Nation Treatment (MFN), National 
Treatment (NT) and Prohibition of Quantitative 
Restrictions (PQR).
Favoring the fact that the tariffs set for crude 
oil, oil products and petrochemical articles are so 
low, they will never be considered as obstacles in 
international trade of petroleum.
However, the principle of prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions which means eliminating any 
prohibiting element in international trade (except for 
specific circumstances) is in sheer contrast with 
OPEC’s strategies for allotment of oil.
It is worth mentioning that OPEC allotment 
will restrict oil production rather than its export.
In addition, clause g of the article 20 of 
GATT has considered the exceptional situation of the 
prohibition of quantitative restrictions as: “this action 
is allowed in cases where the aim of saving in 
consumption of natural resources is implemented to 
the same extent in internal consumption and 
production”. In other words, the petroleum-exporting 
countries can refer to this clause of article 20 of 
GATT in order to justify OPEC’s allotments. Hence, 
the major and unique restriction of this exception is 
that these restrictions should also be applied to 
production and internal consumption (Jimenz, 2002).
One other exceptional case which relates to 
OPEC is clause h of article 20 of GATT agreement. It 
mentions the actions which “have been planned in a 
government to meet the responsibilities determined 
by a goods agreement and none of its signatories 
disapproved the agreement”. Therefore, apparently 
the OPEC members can rely on clause h of article 20. 
This means that “the quantities and the restrictions 
defined by OPEC are the result of an 
intergovernmental goods agreement”. Of course there 
is a place for doubt whether all WTO members 
accept the actions presented by OPEC. Finally, we 
get to the exceptions regarding the national security 
issue which is subject 21 of GATT agreement. It 
implies that no single article of the agreement will be 
interpreted in a way that:
Necessitates any of the parties to present or 
reveal information that are in contrast with its 
national security and benefits.
Avoids each of the parties from making 
decisions in taking actions good for its national 
security and benefits.
Prevents any of the parties from there 
responsibilities which are on their shoulders based on 
the liabilities to the charter of the United Nations for 
maintaining peace and global and international 
safety.
It is generally accepted that governments are 
qualified to decide about the things which support 
their “national security and benefits”. Considering the 
specific reputation of oil department and its strategic 
importance, the above mentioned exception of the 
article 21 can be a legal justification for limitations of 
the import and export of oil and oil products. That is 
why the United States used to apply some controls on 
the export of oil and oil products as a result of 
political and security issues. (Omidbakhsh, 2001).
3. Agreements about subsidies and compensations
This agreement which was signed in 
negotiations in Uruguay defined “subsidy” as 
government’s financial support which will bring 
benefits for the economic agencies. This benefit can 
be in the form of funds transfer, exemption from 
incomes to be collected or some purchases by the 
government. According to this definition “subsidy” 
will be divided into three parts.
Traceable subsidies: the ones which can be 
named under the WTO’s settlement system of 
discrepancies and their related compensating steps.
Forbidden subsidies: they consist of all 
export and import subsidies and paid subsidies given 
to reinforce the consumers in substituting the 
domestic products with the imported ones.
Untraceable or licensed subsidies: the one 
given to all industries of a country and which are not 
restricted to a special industry.
Regarding traceable or forbidden subsidies, 
any of the countries who is a beneficiary can refer the 
matter in form of a complaint to the discrepancy 
settlement column or start their investigation 
processes in order to get compensating duty for the 
imported goods from the exporting country. Anyhow, 
the existing solution of such cases is receiving 
compensating duty. However, this action is allowed 
merely when the damage on the industries of the 
importing country is evident. Otherwise, the 
members can refer to the discrepancy settlement 
column. In other words, if there is no damage to the 
industries of the importing country, it can only bring 
the case to the discrepancy settlement column but can 
not directly set the compensating duty (Gheybi, 
2006).
One aspect of the above mentioned
agreement is that particular subsidies are traceable 
and according to the meaning of the word. 
“particular”, regarding oil one can discuss that since 
the subsidy for oil and natural gas supply in domestic 
markets is lower than the global ones, therefore, it 
will not be considered as a particular subsidy and 
eventually it is untraceable. Nevertheless, 
determining the subsidies as unparticular and 
recognizing them as untraceable is bound to legal 
announcement of the committee of subsidies and to 
WTO’s compensating actions. Any implication of the 
natural resources subsidies will obviously affect on 
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the ability of the petroleum-exporting countries in 
utilizing their oil and other natural resources as a 
reinforcing tool for varying their domestic 
economics. For instance, in the early 1980s 
America’s international trade court interpreted public 
benefit as: “it should never ever be given to a specific 
receivers and if in action special organizations or 
people benefit from it, they should be subject to 
paying compensating duty (Omidbakhsh, 2001).
4. Agreement about compensating and anti-
dumping rights
This agreement which is a part of WTO’s 
package of agreements provides an exclusive 
framework for anti-dumping attempts. According to 
this agreement which is set like a precise legal text 
(paragraph 1, article 2), a dumped product is the one 
which is sold with a price lower than its own in the 
target country, has an export price lower than similar 
goods in the market of target country and is used in 
the country it is exported to.
For a member of a WTO to be able to make 
anti-dumping moves, it is necessary to prove that 
such thing as dumping has actually happened. Then, 
it should be proven that it has caused a great damage 
to the domestic industries of the importing country or 
will disrupt the process of development of domestic 
industries. Finally, the cause-effect relationship 
between dumping and damage should be clarified.
This product can have critical influences on 
the export of oil products and petrochemical goods.
Supplying cheap energy, oil and gas to these 
industries in the gas and petroleum-exporting 
countries has always been considered a reason for 
dumping in the importing countries. Based on article 
2 of the agreement, this reason will be dumping only 
if supply of the producing companies in the preferred 
range of prices is restricted to exporting industries. In 
Petroleum-exporting countries, cheap raw material 
(oil or gas) is almost to the same extent available for 
export industries or others and so from this aspect 
they can not be considered as dumping. 
In WTO’s framework, anti-dumping actions 
should only be executed by the governments rather 
than the private section. Besides, in case that the 
respective country decides to take these actions, it 
should first go to the Goods Trade Council of WTO 
to get a license. Then, the dumped country should 
refer to discrepancy settlement column and ask for a 
board of investigators. This board can not express its 
opinion regarding the dumping but it just can 
evaluate and assess the legitimacy of the 
investigations done and information presented by the 
complaining country.
From the point of view of the secretariat of 
OPEC, one other issue that exists in interpreting and 
executing the international trade laws is misuse of the 
anti-dumping rules. Since other obstacles of trade are 
more or less eliminated, today countries are 
increasingly bringing lame excuses to use anti-
dumping tariffs for restricting import. As an example 
one can mention the actions of the Committee of 
saving domestic oil (CSDO) which is a group 
including independent oil producers in the US. Based 
on United States’ anti-dumping rules, this group has 
tried several times to accuse some countries such as 
Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Mexico and Iraq of 
dumping their petrochemical goods and oil products 
in America and consequently damaging America’s 
oil industry. These accusations are based only on 
America’s anti-dumping rules rather than that of 
WTO’s. Hence, by collecting the effects of dumping 
of these exporting countries on the US, America is 
allowed to be certain of the damages of the 
competing industries in the US and consider it a 
cause for anti-dumping actions.
Anyway, the anti-dumping side effects are 
among the causes which restrict the abilities of the 
petroleum-exporting countries to exploit natural 
resources for enhancing their process of economic 
and industrial development (Jimenz, 2002).
5. Agreement about the technical obstacles 
confronting trades
This agreement which is a competed version 
of the Tokyo negotiations (TBT) includes a list of 
legal issues that should be the base of setting 
technical rules. This list also includes the 
environmental subjects. Considering the effect of oil 
on the environment and the complexity of the 
technical rules and standards of the oil section, 
providing that oil becomes a part of WTO, its 
production and international trade will be influenced 
by the mentioned agreement. Some of the agreed 
upon rules of TBT agreement are directly related to 
petroleum-exporting countries.
Under the TBT agreement, it is mandatory 
to observe certain standards and technical rules in 
order to be able to meet the environmental goals. The 
TBT agreement is considered environmental-oriented 
from the aspect that it will provide the importing 
countries with the opportunity to appoint 
discriminations against crude oil and oil products of 
the exporting countries. Inn addition, the 
environmental movements can easily be justified as 
they do not need accurate tests to improve their 
effectiveness. It is not as well necessary to improve 
the effectiveness of these movements in reaching the 
environmental goals because these agreements do not 
obligate their members to present valid 
documentation and proves to be able to scientifically 
justify the technical rules. As a result, UNCTAD has 
Journal of American Science, 2011;7(7)                                                   http://www.americanscience.org
http://www.americanscience.org     editor@americanscience.org845
laid down that the environmental rules should be 
based on necessity and some factors such as 
effectiveness, indiscrimination, clarity and not 
causing disturbance in the process of trade should be 
considered in their collection. (Jimenz, 2001).
6. General agreement about service trading
GATT’s general agreement of service 
trading includes 6 parts, 29 articles and 8
attachments. This agreement can be used regarding 
all kinds of actions used for service trading no matter 
in which of these forms like rules, regulations, 
processes, decisions, directorial actions or else. Its 
goal is to develop service trading as a tool for rising 
economic growth of all parties and advancement of 
all developing countries.
This agreement does not directly affect the 
oil and oil product trades. Yet, as a result of its 
significant impact on production of oil, it will 
indirectly cause changes in its trade and that is 
possible through changes and transformations 
brought about in the structure of services related to 
oil.
In most countries of the world all activities 
regarding oil industry including services is under the 
control of governments or private sections which has 
caused massive exclusiveness by vertical merges. 
This has reduced the level of competition in these 
activities. Based on this, provided that oil and oil 
products get into WTO’s negotiations, these activities 
which have a key function in global oil industry will 
also need to be part of GATT’s agreements and 
eventually have various effects on different countries
(Gheybi, 2006).
7. The joining of the OPEC members to WTO and 
its consequences
Before, the OPEC members were not able to 
influence on the results of GATT’s negotiations. This 
was so because none of them participated in GATT’s 
meetings and most of them thought that oil’s strategic 
success in global market is sufficient for oil section to 
be excluded from all rules and regulations passed by 
GATT. Today, they are suffering from the
consequences of their 50 years of being away from 
GATT and WTO. Nowadays becoming a member 
requires more profound economic, political and legal 
changes.
Here and now on one hand some of the 
OPEC members have become and some are in the 
way of becoming a member of WTO. On the other 
hand, in March 2000, as a permanent international 
organization, OPEC officially asked WTO to become 
a superintendent of meeting sessions of some OPEC 
committees such as general council, development and 
trade, and environment and trade committees. All 
these help so that these countries would be able to 
coordinate their point of views and benefits (and 
probably form a forceful alliance within WTO) and 
raise their competence in bargaining and also affect 
the results of future WTO negotiations through their 
active participation.
Pertaining to everyday expansion of WTO’s 
domain and new subjects gradually presented in their 
negotiations as well as the everyday increase of the 
optional rules and regulations into mandatory ones, 
we can rationally come to the point that the legal 
framework of this organization is ever-increasing and 
can more and more influence on the international 
economic relationship of the countries whether a 
member or not. Therefore, the consequences of 
becoming a member or overlooking to become one in 
this organization can not be measured by the present 
information. Chances are that we witness unforeseen 
consequences for the nonmember countries (Jimenz, 
2001).
Most of the petroleum-exporting countries 
are the underdeveloped ones and they rely on one 
single kind of natural resource. Having that in mind, 
one implies that the greatest impact of WTO’s rules 
on these countries is on their right of national control 
over their natural resources which is considered their 
unique relative advantage in foreign trades. The rules 
that WTO passes or their interpretations can restrict 
these countries ability in exploiting their relative 
natural resources to reach economic growth.
WTO’s agreements impose several other 
musts on all countries in using natural resources. 
These particularly limit petroleum-exporting 
countries in exploiting their natural resources for 
accomplishing economic and industrial growth. Rules 
regarding the subsidies and anti-dumping constrain 
many policies of the petroleum-exporting countries 
concerning economic growth. Even now the above 
mentioned agreements include articles which under 
special circumstances allow supply of energy to the 
domestic industries with a lower price than that of the 
global one. But providing these situations is not easy 
for the petroleum-exporting countries. WTO’s 
agreements are moving on a track which will go to 
forbidding the donation of any subsidies to industries 
in the process of economic and industrial growth of 
developing countries.
Of course WTO considers certain privileges 
for developing countries which are:
● having more flexibility in government’s 
use of tools of economic and commercial policy
● longer transfer period (changing internal 
rules and structures)
● receiving technical assistance
It is worth explaining that all OPEC 
members that are now WTO members are among the 
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list of developing countries and hence benefit from 
these privileges. The title “underdeveloped” will only 
be given to a country by one of the WTO members 
and there does not exist a standard definition for it in 
any of the texts or documents of WTO. Though, 
proving that a country is developing is not an easy 
job for a country that demands membership of WTO 
for the members will oppose this claim and will not 
simply accept to give these privileges to a country.
OPEC’s secretariat has marked the countries 
exporting several types of raw materials that in the 
clauses of section 4 of GATT’s agreements have 
particularly been named as “developing countries” to 
prove that the OPEC members are considered 
developing. 
For instance, clause 36 refers to: “... the 
necessity of providing a suitable situation for the 
exporters of these goods in order to have access to 
the global market (of raw materials). And also 
according to the situation, some policies should be 
carried out for making stability especially regarding 
the prices of these goods and causing progress in 
global market”.
Clause 38 further mentions that: “… if 
possible, by the means of taking efficient steps in the 
framework of international arrangements … a 
convenient and stable situation which is needed in 
international market of these goods (raw material) be 
provided so that the exporters become able to sell 
their products in good prices and have price stability 
in the market”.11
It is of course essential to differentiate 
negotiations of crude oil with WTO members on one 
hand and having a group like OPEC in WTO on the 
other. In other words, the behavior of WTO members 
will not be the same with international trade of oil 
and OPEC. OPEC is a political-economic association 
whose members try to defend their benefits against 
all the pressures and interferences of great 
economical powers of the world which are also key 
WTO members. They are also attempting not to lose 
their authority and interventions in the global oil 
market. 
On the other hand at the present stage 
neither the structure of power nor the decision 
making system of WTO allows OPEC, a third-world 
organization, for such an attendance.
Obviously we should not forget the fact that 
the developing countries which are WTO members 
will not be satisfied with OPEC’s participation as a 
third-world organization as most of the developing 
countries are among the major importers of crude oil 
and from this aspect their benefits are in contrast with 
those of its exporters. Yet, their benefits are 
remarkably in accordance with those of the 
developed countries of WTO (Omidbakhsh, 2001).
In the end, it is worth reciting the 
advantages and disadvantages of becoming a member 
of WTO:
disadvantages: the possibility of using the 
following facilities would be less for those countries 
which are members of WTO:
supplying cheap energy to the domestic 
industries
restricting the purchases of oil companies to 
the domestic market
restricting the purchases of governmental 
companies to the domestic market ( this is regarding 
the consignees of the collateral agreement of 
governmental purchases)
One should compare the disadvantages of 
not being a WTO member with the costs on has to 
bear. Not being a part of GATT system of WTO has 
serious costs for the nonmember countries because 
they will be affected by the decisions made in this 
framework anyway. Remaining out of the cycle of 
WTO is not advisable for petroleum-exporting 
countries. That is because even when they do not 
become a member, these countries should accept the 
consequences of execution of the agreements on their 
economy without having any influence on the results 
of negotiations. Besides, over time it might become 
more difficult to get a membership of WTO for those 
who are now qualified by are not a member.
Advantages: the possible advantages for 
members of WTO might be:
influencing on the results and the future 
ways of negotiations: since important issues 
regarding capitalism are going to be discussed about 
in the future negotiations, it is better for countries to 
be able to participate in them.
In addition to the impeding factors of 
international oil trade such as taxes and 
environmental policies of exporting countries, some 
countries have recommended that there be separate 
mechanisms for negotiations between the exporting 
countries and consumers regarding these issues. 
However, these mechanisms do not yet exist and it is 
too soon to predict its future.
Having access to the mechanism of settling 
discrepancies: this point can be used when the 
consuming countries apply discriminatory acts 
against oil. This has been once been used by 
Venezuela and Brazil in the past and has had 
satisfactory results.
The World Trade Organization  does not 
directly follow the cases of deviations from its 
agreements and it is up to the country  which claims 
of having unfairness should take its case to the 
related column: This has brought amenities to the 
members and made the WTO agreements flexible.
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Weak countries defend their resources in 
multilateral negotiations; usually the determined 
conditions of collateral negotiations and agreements 
are more difficult than the multilateral ones.
It is necessary to emphasize on the fact that 
these advantages will exist only if the petroleum-
exporting countries have a congruent procedure in 
negotiations and if possible provide alliances inside 
WTO to increase their power of bargaining in 
negotiations (Jimenz, 2003).
9. Conclusion
Aiming to assist free trade and remove the 
obstacles, the World Trade Organization by having 
the most members compared to other international 
organizations is now the leading one in international 
trade and is going to supersede oil and oil trade.
Though oil was not vividly emphasized in 
the negotiations resulting in the establishment of oil, 
no law of multi-trade system has clearly excluded it.
The oil exporters, who once thought 
strategic nature of oil suffices them for remaining out 
of global multi-trade system, are now concerned that 
by joining the WTO they will not be able to support 
oil prices through controlling its production.
In the situation where WTO is going to ban 
close-to-zero tariffs of goods, some countries like 
United States and Japan are deciding not to restrict 
their tariffs of crude oil. Hence, the benefits of the 
petroleum-exporting countries require them to ask for 
tariffs of crude oil to become a part of these legal 
necessities. This is not possible unless joining WTO 
and participating in its negotiation cycle.
Those petroleum-exporting countries who 
have not participated in negotiation cycles during the 
50 years of GATT and WTO are paying a great cost 
for being far from the multi-aspect trade system. 
Besides, the later countries try to join WTO, the more 
complex, lengthy and liable will be their process of 
joining. Since the taken decisions in the framework 
of world trade will affect the nonmember countries as 
well, it is essential that the OPEC members 
investigate all advantages and disadvantages of this 
membership and step in the way.
A- We are now in a situation in which 
the oil-consuming countries impose discriminatory 
actions on import of oil products in the form of 
environmental issues or tariff plans. In such 
conditions, since there exists a more flexible 
condition for developing countries in WTO, the 
system of settling discrepancies will help these 
countries in having a shelter to restore their rights. 
Finally, simultaneous membership in OPEC and 
WTO bring about opportunities for these countries to 
in addition to their alliance also have an impact on 
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